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The Impact of Horizon 2020 on Innovation in 
Europe
The EU’s stagnation on many innovation indicators led to a number of efforts to spur a turnaround. 
One of most visible projects has been the Horizon 2020 strategy, which devotes unprecedented 
levels of funding to the promotion of R&D and innovation. But does this strategy address the right 
issues to promote innovation? Is Horizon 2020 right to ignore geographical considerations when 
allocating funding? What policy instruments does Horizon 2020 recommend, and has it led to 
novel strategies being employed, beyond the increase in R&D funding? What steps are individual 
countries taking? Most importantly, what impact is Horizon 2020 actually having on innovation in 
the EU?
DOI: 10.1007/s10272-015-0521-7
Reinhilde Veugelers* and Michele Cincera
How to Turn on the Innovation Growth Machine in Europe
Europe maintains lofty ambitions for building its future 
growth and prosperity and safeguarding its social mod-
el through innovation. The European Union carved its 
ambition to become the most competitive knowledge-
based economy in the world into its 2002 Lisbon Strat-
egy. An ambitious target of devoting three per cent of 
GDP to R&D by 2010 was set. And in its subsequent Eu-
rope 2020 strategy and Innovation Union Flagship, it set 
out a roadmap for sustainable and inclusive growth that 
needs to be smart.
Despite this policy of attention to innovation-based 
growth and R&D targeting, Europe’s performance on in-
novation remains weak to date. According to the Inno-
vation Union Scoreboard (IUS) indicator, developed by 
the European Commission in support of its Innovation 
Union Strategy,1 Europe is not doing well.2 Europe’s gap 
relative to the US holds across almost all individual in-
*  Reinhilde Veugelers acknowledges fi nancial support from KULeuven 
(GOA/12/003) and FWO Flanders (G.0825.12), as well as the com-
ments received from the participants of the EUROFORUM Confer-
ence, June 2013, Leuven, especially Michel Praet and Bruno van Pot-
telsberghe.
1 IUS is a composite indicator capturing eight dimensions of innovation: 
Human Resources, Research Systems, Finance, Firm Investment, 
Linkages, IPR, Innovations and Economic Effects. For the internation-
al benchmarking of Europe, it uses information from 12 indicators to 
assess these eight dimensions.
2 European Commission: Innovation Union Competitiveness report, 
2011.
dicators that go into the IUS score. This is a refl ection 
of the systemic nature of Europe’s failing innovation ca-
pacity. Europe’s overall (public and private) R&D-to-GDP 
ratio currently stands below two per cent, signifi cantly 
lower than the ratios in the US, Japan, South Korea and 
Singapore. Furthermore, there are relatively few signs of 
progress. China is fast catching up and already on par 
with the EU.
Why is it so hard to improve Europe’s innovative perfor-
mance? Does Europe have the capacity for knowledge-
based growth? This contribution takes a close look at 
the evidence on Europe’s innovation performance. We 
look at heterogeneity across European countries: Do 
some countries or parts of Europe do better than oth-
ers? Is there a convergence over time among European 
countries in innovation capacity along a process of in-
tegration? The analysis fi nds that Europe maintains an 
innovation system, with a few well performing countries, 
in which a slow process of convergence is taking place. 
Within the innovation ecosystem, it is particularly the 
business sector that generates an innovation defi cit, 
and this business sector defi cit is highly persistent over 
time.
Why does Europe’s business sector, despite having 
some top performers, have a persistently lower innova-
tive capacity on average when compared to the US? We 
investigate the age and sector composition of Europe’s 
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business innovation structure and identify the lack of 
young innovative companies (“yollies”) in innovation-
based growth sectors as the major source of Europe’s 
persistent lagging business innovation defi cit relative 
to the US. Europe simply has too few yollies in the right 
sectors, which can form the nucleus for a capacity to 
shift economies towards new opportunities for growth.
The obvious next issue we examine is why Europe is less 
capable of nurturing new strong innovative fi rms in new 
sectors. What are the major impediments facing inno-
vative fi rms in new sectors in Europe? We focus on an 
important impediment that hampers young fi rms with 
highly innovative growth projects, namely access to ear-
ly-stage risk fi nance.
The paper concludes with some policy implications. 
What can Europe do to make its ambitions for knowl-
edge-based growth more realistic? A policy agenda that 
can tackle the systemic defi cit is not easy to establish 
and requires a long-term commitment to support inno-
vation.
Europe’s persistent differences in innovation per-
formance
Although integration has resulted in some level of con-
vergence in innovation, the pace of convergence is slow. 
There still remain substantial country differences, not 
only in terms of stock of knowledge but also in the vary-
ing capacities to leverage knowledge into growth. To as-
sess convergence, we look at the σ-coeffi cient, i.e. the 
coeffi cient of variation (√VAR/MEAN). σ-convergence 
occurs when the dispersion across a group of econo-
mies decreases over time.
In the 2011 IUS exercise, the best performing (“fron-
tier”) countries were Sweden, Denmark, Germany and 
Finland. The weakest group of countries includes most 
transition economies, including Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithu-
ania and Romania.
As Table 1 shows, the coeffi cient of variation on the IUS 
score is high, illustrating the high level of heterogeneity 
on innovation capacity in Europe. Although it has slightly 
decreased in the period 2006-2010, refl ecting a slow 
process of σ-convergence, dispersion remains substan-
tial. This dispersion holds between frontier and “catch-
ing-up” countries, as the difference in average scores of 
both groups demonstrates (see Panel B). Over the time 
period considered, a slow catching-up has taken place 
between the catching-up and the frontier countries in 
Europe, as the gap scores indicate, but the gap remains 
considerable. Within both groups, however, there is also 
substantial heterogeneity, particularly in the catching-up 
countries, as the coeffi cient of variation indicates (see 
Panel C). This dispersion has only slightly decreased in 
the period considered. Furthermore, in the group of fron-
tier countries, the gap between the top fi ve and the rest 
is highly stable over time.
As the business sector is responsible for most of Eu-
rope’s R&D intensity gap relative to the US, and as this 
shows a persistent time pattern, we further zero in on the 
heterogeneity and convergence across European coun-
tries in the business component of R&D expenditures.
The heterogeneity in business R&D performance across 
European countries is substantial, as the coeffi cient of 
variation shows. And although the coeffi cient of variation 
has decreased over time, demonstrating σ-convergence, 
the pace of convergence is slow.
Overall, the data show the extreme immobility of busi-
ness R&D performance in Europe. At the same time, 
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Table 1
Heterogeneity and convergence in Europe on 
innovation performance
there is substantial heterogeneity within Europe, which 
goes beyond the divide between old and new member 
states and also involves countries like Greece at the bot-
tom. The process of structural change and convergence/
catching up within Europe is very slow, as indicated by 
the very stable rankings of European countries over time 
on business R&D performance.
Age and sectoral composition effects on Europe’s 
business R&D defi cit
The continued business R&D defi cit is central in Eu-
rope’s innovation defi cit. It is a symptom of its low ca-
pacity for both structural change and a shift towards 
new growth areas. What explains this business R&D 
defi cit? Why does Europe’s business sector have less 
innovative capacity on average when compared to the 
US, despite its top performers? And why is this defi cit 
so persistent? In line with O’Sullivan, Aghion et al. and 
others, this contribution claims that Europe’s persistent 
business innovation gap is correlated with its industrial 
structure.3 New fi rms fail to play a signifi cant role in the 
innovation dynamics of European industry, especially in 
the high-tech sectors. This is illustrated by their inability 
to enter the market, and more importantly, for the most 
effi cient innovative entrants to grow to world leadership. 
The churning that characterises the creative destruction 
process in a knowledge-based economy encounters 
signifi cant obstacles in the EU, suggesting barriers to 
growth for new innovating fi rms that ultimately weaken 
Europe’s growth potential. Bartelsman et al. found that 
post-entry performance differs markedly between Eu-
rope and the US,4 which suggests the importance of bar-
riers to company growth. This inability of new European 
fi rms to grow large seems to manifest itself particularly 
in the high-tech, high-growth sectors, most notably the 
ICT sector. This correlates with the European economy’s 
lower degree of specialisation in the R&D-intensive, 
high-growth sectors of the 1990s, again most notably 
the ICT sectors.5
This structural European innovation defi cit story, related 
to company age and the sectoral make-up of the econ-
omy, has recently attracted much attention. It has been 
3 M. O ’ S u l l i v a n : The EU’s R&D defi cit and innovation policy, report of 
the Expert Group on Knowledge for Growth, European Commission, 
Brussels 2008; P. A g h i o n , E. B a r t e l s m a n , E. P e ro t t i , S. S c a r-
p e t t a : Barriers to exit, experimentation and comparative advantage, 
RICAFE2 WP 056, London School of Economics, 2008.
4 E. B a r t e l s m a n , J. H a l t i w a n g e r, S. S c a r p e t t a : Microeconomic 
evidence of creative destruction in industrial and developing coun-
tries, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-114/3, Tinbergen In-
stitute, 2004.
5 P. M o n c a d a - P a t e r n o - C a s t e l l o , C. C i u p a g e a , K. S m i t h , A. 
Tu b k e , M. Tu b b s : Does Europe perform too little corporate R&D?, 
in: Research Policy, Vol. 39, 2009, pp. 523-536.
IUS 2006 2010
Panel A: Within Europe1
Average Europe 0.41 0.45
Coeffi cient of variation 0.43 0.40
Top countries SE, CH, DK, DE, FI
(0.758-0.638)
CH, SE, DK, FI, DE
(0.831-0.696)
Bottom countries BG, LV, TR, RO
(0.159-0.219)
LV, TK, BG, LT, RO
(0.201-0.237)
Panel B: Frontier versus catching-up countries2
Average frontier countries 0.59 0.62
Coeffi cient of variation 0.20 0.19
Average catching-up 0.30 0.34
Coeffi cient of variation 0.36 0.33
Gap catching-up/frontier 
(=100)
0.51 0.55
Panel C: Within frontier; within catching-up3
Average frontier countries 0.59 0.62
Top 5 0.70 0.74
Non-top 5 0.52 0.55
Average catching-up 0.30 0.34
Former cohesion countries 0.39 0.44
EU13 0.29 0.33
1 The range of IUS scores, in brackets, for the group of countries considered 
includes, in addition to the EU27, Switzerland and accession countries. Due 
to their small size, we do not report on LU, MT, CY, MK and IC.  2 The catch-
ing-up countries include the EU13, the four former cohesion countries, the 
other transition countries and Turkey. There are 13 frontier countries (AT, BE, 
DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, LU, NL, NO, SE, CH, UK). 3 The Top 5 countries are CH, SE, 
DE, FI and DK; former cohesion countries are ES, PT, IE and EL.
S o u rc e : Own calculations based on Innovation Union Scoreboard, 2011.
Table 2
Business R&D expenditures in Europe
Business R&D as % of GDP
S o u rc e : Own calculations based on Innovation Union Scorecard, 2010.
2004 2008
Average EU27 1.16 1.21
Coeffi cient of variation 0.98 0.86
Top countries SE, FI, CH
(2.63-2.14)
FI, SE, CH, DK
(2.76-2.01)
Bottom countries BG, TK, PL, LT, 
EL, LV, RO
(0.12-0.21)
BG, LV, EL, RO
(0.10-0.17)
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EU US
Aerospace & defence 1.50 1.13
Biotechnology 0.32 2.20
Computer hardware & computer services 0.08 1.39
Health care equipment & services 0.70 1.86
Internet 0 2.54
Pharmaceuticals 1.27 1.16
Semiconductors 0.50 1.72
Software 0.51 2.05
Telecommunications equipment 1.38 1.09
All IBG sectors 0.89 1.43
investigated in more detail in Veugelers and Cincera,6 in 
which the JRC-EC-IPTS Industrial R&D Scoreboard fi g-
ures of global R&D expenditures of leading innovators by 
age cohort and sector are decomposed.7 Their analysis 
confi rms that the major source of Europe’s lagging busi-
ness innovation defi cit relative to the US is the lack of 
yollies, i.e. young companies that have grown into world-
leading innovators, in new innovation-based growth 
sectors.
The age composition of Europe’s leading innovators
Among the US leading innovators in the Industrial R&D 
Scoreboard, more than half are “young” (i.e. born after 
1975), qualifying them as yollies. US yollies include Mi-
crosoft, Cisco, Amgen, Oracle, Google, Sun, Qualcomm, 
Apple, Genzyme and Ebay. By contrast, in Europe only 
one out of fi ve leading innovators is “young”. Yollies ac-
count for 35 per cent of total business R&D in the US, 
while in Europe this fi gure is a mere seven per cent!
The R&D intensity of European leading companies, 
whether old or young, is on average smaller than the 
world average, particularly in comparison to the US. 
With the US benchmarked at 100, Europe’s overall R&D 
intensity gap score is 63 per cent. This gap holds both 
for older companies (“ollies”) and yollies. But the differ-
ence is more pronounced for yollies. While the R&D in-
tensity gap score for Europe’s ollies is 80 per cent, the 
score for yollies is 43 per cent.
The lower overall R&D intensity of Europe’s leading in-
novators can thus be explained by the combination of 
the following facts:
• Europe has fewer yollies than the US. This matters 
because yollies have a higher level of R&D intensity 
when compared to ollies.
• Europe-based yollies are less R&D-intensive than 
their US counterparts.
• European ollies are also less R&D-intensive than their 
US counterparts.
As the difference in RDI between Europe and the US is 
small for ollies, the most important factor in Europe’s 
overall RDI defi cit is related to yollies: not only that Eu-
6 R. Ve u g e l e r s ,  M. C i n c e r a : Europe’s Missing Yollies, Bruegel 
Policy Brief 2010/06, Bruegel, Brussels 2010; R. Ve u g e l e r s , M. 
C i n c e r a : Young Leading Innovators and EU’s R&D intensity gap, 
Bruegel Policy Contribution 2010/09, Bruegel, Brussels 2010.
7 European Commission: The 2008 EU Industrial R&D Investment 
Scoreboard, 2008.
rope has fewer of them, but also that the yollies that Eu-
rope has are less R&D-intensive than their US counter-
parts.
The sectoral composition of Europe’s leading innovators
To analyse the sectoral composition problem for ex-
plaining Europe’s lagging business R&D defi cit, we look 
at the sectors in which Europe specialises its R&D ac-
tivities. We are particularly interested in Europe’s posi-
tion in the sectors that offer the largest scope for knowl-
edge-based growth. To this end, we identify sectors that 
have (i) an above-average level of R&D intensity, (ii) an 
above-average R&D growth rate and/or (iii) an above-
average share of young companies among their leading 
innovators. This set of sectors includes aerospace, bio-
technology, computer hardware & services, health care 
equipment & services, internet, pharmaceuticals, semi-
conductors, software, and telecom equipment. These 
are all sectors in the ICT and the health realms. We label 
these sectors “innovation-based growth sectors” (IBG 
sectors).
Table 3 shows Europe’s R&D positions in the IBG sec-
tors in which it specialises. When looking at the individ-
ual IBG sectors, Europe only has revealed technological 
advantages (RTAs) in aerospace, pharmaceuticals and 
telecom equipment, of which only the latter is a “young” 
Table 3
EU and US sector specialisation of R&D activities in 
innovation-based growth sectors
N o t e :  Revealed technological advantages (RTAs) are calculated as the 
share of the region in total sectoral R&D relative to the share of the region 
in overall R&D. An RTA value higher than 1 refl ects that the region is tech-
nologically specialised in this sector.
S o u rc e : Based on R. Ve u g e l e r s ,  M. C i n c e r a :  Young Leading Inno-
vators and EU’s R&D intensity gap, Bruegel Policy Contribution 2010/09, 
Bruegel, Brussels 2010.
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Europe US
Share of yollies in IBG sectors 62 84
RDI of yollies in IBG sectors 13.9 12.6
RDI of region in IBG sectors 12.0 10.0
sector. The US, by contrast, specialises in all IBG sec-
tors.8
Europe’s sectoral composition, i.e. its failure to spe-
cialise in the sectors with the biggest opportunities for 
knowledge-based growth, not only explains Europe’s 
overall lagging R&D performance. It can also explain 
why Europe’s young leading innovators are underper-
forming on R&D. It is not because European yollies are 
less R&D-intensive when compared to their US counter-
parts in the same sectors (the so-called intrinsic effect). 
Rather, it is because European yollies operate primarily 
in less R&D-intensive sectors (the so-called structural 
effect).
Table 4 shows that Europe has signifi cantly fewer of 
its yollies in the sectors with the greatest opportunities 
for innovation-based growth. In the Internet sector, Eu-
rope does not have a single company that has achieved 
“Leading Innovator” status. In biotechnology, as well, 
Europe has fewer yollies when compared to the US. 
Both of these sectors thus serve to illustrate Europe’s in-
ability to raise young innovators to leading status in sec-
tors with high innovation-based growth potential (struc-
tural effect). But the young innovators it has in these 
sectors are as R&D-intensive as their US counterparts, if 
not even more so. This holds particularly in the ICT sec-
tors. Table 4 thus confi rms that the lower R&D intensity 
of Europe’s Young Leading Innovators, when compared 
to their US counterparts, is due to a structural, sectoral 
composition effect, namely Europe’s lack of presence in 
the innovation-based growth sectors.9
Explaining Europe’s age and sectoral structural in-
novation defi cit
Why are there fewer companies starting up and grow-
ing into world-leading innovators that spend suffi cient 
resources on R&D to make it onto the Scoreboard of the 
largest R&D spenders? And why is this happening rela-
tively less often, compared to the US, in new technolo-
gy-based sectors, particularly biotechnology and ICT?
The most frequently cited explanation for the differences 
in dynamic structure between Europe and the US is a 
greater willingness on the part of US fi nancial markets to 
8 Europe specialises its R&D in sectors characterised as medium R&D-
intensive (see P. M o n c a d a - P a t e r n o - C a s t e l l o ,  C. C i u p a g e a , 
K. S m i t h , A. Tu b k e , M. Tu b b s , op. cit.). These include automo-
biles, chemicals, electrics, industrial machinery and telecom ser-
vices. All of them are older, medium R&D-intensive sectors. Further-
more, automobiles, chemicals and electrics are sectors with below-
average R&D growth.
9 See also R. Ve u g e l e r s ,  M. C i n c e r a : Europe’s Missing . . . , op. cit.
fund the growth of new companies in new sectors.10 Evi-
dence from the German Community Innovation Survey 
confi rms the importance of fi nancial constraints for inno-
vating companies in general, and particularly for young 
innovating companies.11 Young highly innovative com-
panies report on average higher obstacles to innovation 
than other innovating fi rms. Financial constraints – both 
internal and external – are the main barriers to innova-
tion for young highly innovative companies. Although 
this also holds for other innovating fi rms, the differen-
tial is largest for younger companies. Cincera, Ravet and 
Veugelers examine econometrically the fi nancial con-
straints faced by world-leading R&D investors.12 Their 
analysis confi rms that over the last decade, younger 
leading innovators appear to be more affected by fi nanc-
ing constraints than their older counterparts, particularly 
in the EU.
Although the evidence clearly supports the importance 
of access to fi nance for highly innovative growth pro-
jects, the evidence also shows that one can neverthe-
less not ignore the importance of other impediments to 
innovation which reduce the expected rates of return on 
R&D investments. These other barriers relate to prob-
lems in the demand for innovations, regulatory burdens, 
access to skills and problems in partnering.13 Cincera 
and Veugelers examine econometrically the rates of re-
turn to R&D investments for world-leading R&D inves-
tors.14 They fi nd that, while young fi rms in the US suc-
ceed in realising signifi cantly higher rates of return to 
R&D as compared to their older counterparts, European 
10 M. O ’ S u l l i v a n , op. cit.
11 C. S c h n e i d e r, R. Ve u g e l e r s : On Young Highly Innovative Compa-
nies: why they matter and how (not) to policy support them, in: Indus-
try and Corporate Change, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2010, pp. 969-1007.
12 M. C i n c e r a , J. R a v e t , R. Ve u g e l e r s : R&D fi nancing constraints of 
younger aged leading innovators in the EU and the US, in: Economics 
of Innovation and New Technology, forthcoming.
13 C. S c h n e i d e r, R. Ve u g e l e r s , op. cit.
14 M. C i n c e r a ,  R. Ve u g e l e r s :  Differences in the rates of return to 
R&D for European and US Young Leading R&D fi rms, in: Research 
Policy, Vol. 43, No. 8, 2014, pp. 1413-142.
Table 4
Yollies in innovation-based growth sectors
S o u rc e : Based on R. Ve u g e l e r s ,  M. C i n c e r a :  Young Leading Inno-
vators and EU’s R&D intensity gap, Bruegel Policy Contribution 2010/09, 
Bruegel, Brussels 2010.
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fi rms fail to generate signifi cant rates of return, even if 
they are yollies and even if they are in high-tech sectors.
All this is a strong reminder that the innovation defi cit in 
Europe is systemic. Access to fi nance cannot be tack-
led in isolation but should be embedded in an innovation 
environment that also addresses the other barriers to in-
novation. As these other barriers reduce the expected 
rates of return on highly innovative projects, they affect 
the appetite of fi nancers to provide funds for these pro-
jects.
Recommendations for innovation policy making in 
Europe
The evidence presented in this contribution has impor-
tant implications for Europe’s innovation policy agenda. 
The evidence suggests that policies aimed at raising 
R&D expenditure across all types of industries and com-
panies does not address the root causes of Europe’s 
innovation defi cit. To do this, policies need to address 
the specifi c barriers to development of new high R&D-
intensity sectors and companies, as the evidence has 
shown how pivotal these sectors and companies are for 
tackling Europe’s innovation defi cit.
What types of policy interventions are needed in Europe 
to address these specifi c barriers? And how targeted do 
they need to be? A fi rst important remark is that a gener-
al innovation policy aimed at improving the environment 
for innovation remains necessary. Because yollies need 
to interact with other innovators, and because innova-
tors should not be impeded while they mature, a policy 
to address the lack of young companies in young R&D-
intensive sectors needs to fi t into a comprehensive in-
novation policy. This innovation policy should further the 
integration of the European capital, labour, product and 
services markets; make it easier for players in the inno-
vation system to interact; and, at the same time, ensure 
healthy competition.
Such a comprehensive innovation policy will be neces-
sary, but it will not be suffi cient. Policy measures are also 
needed to tackle the specifi c barriers faced in new sec-
tors by new companies. This includes inter alia access 
to external fi nancing for fast-growing, highly innovative 
projects, through public funding and/or by leveraging 
private risk funding. First and foremost, the fragmenta-
tion in the EU venture capital (VC) market should be ad-
dressed: the critical size for a viable, fl uid, thick Euro-
pean VC market can only be reached when VC markets 
operate at an integrated European scale and are open to 
the world. Beyond furthering the single market for risk 
fi nancing , a system of grants for high-risk, innovative 
projects by young companies during their critical start-
up and development stages – when fi nancial market bar-
riers are at their highest – cannot be missing in the set of 
EU instruments.
At this stage of the analysis, when there are still too 
many unknowns about whether and which interventions 
are effective for which countries, policy makers are ad-
vised to engage in close monitoring of emerging inno-
vative markets. This will help to determine whether the 
right mix of policy instruments is present in the country 
and if the mix is effective for ensuring the smooth de-
velopment of companies in new markets. Furthermore, 
policies that are shown to be ineffective in other markets 
can be adapted or abandoned altogether. Monitoring 
should include a strong prospective angle, able to iden-
tify new emerging markets well in advance so that a pro-
active policy mix can be identifi ed for the very earliest 
phases of development, when the risk of market failure 
is at its highest.
Rainer Frietsch, Christian Rammer and Torben Schubert
Heterogeneity of Innovation Systems in Europe and Horizon 2020
formance of the science system.1 This is not only due to 
1 European Commission: Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014, Brussels 
2014; C. R a m m e r, B. A s c h h o f f , D. C r a s s , T. D o h e r r, M. H u d , C. 
K ö h l e r, B. P e t e r s , T. S c h u b e r t , F. S c h w i e b a c h e r : Innovation-
sverhalten der deutschen Wirtschaft – Indikatorenbericht zur Innova-
tionserhebung 2013, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), 
Mannheim 2014.
The US is still the most important national science and 
research system in the world, with China quickly catch-
ing up – not only in terms of quantity, but also in terms 
of quality. Europe, however, as the largest transnational 
science and research system, is ahead of these national 
systems. Recent analysis suggests that the European Un-
ion as a whole overtook the US with respect to the per-
